Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/23: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101800001-3 25X1 30 July 1980 Memorandum Prepared by the Southwest Asia Analytic Center/Iran of the National Foreign Assessments Center/ 25X1 THE STATUS OF TRAN'S NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES Non-Muslim religious minorities fear that the continued lack of central control and the development of a strict Sniite Islamic Republic threaten their security despite assurances to the contrary by the Khomeini regime. Except for the Bahais, however, members of Iran's non-Muslim religious communities seem to be relatively safe as long as they are not identified with internal or external forces seen as a threat to the Khomeini regime. 25X1 The small non-Muslim Iranian religious communities --Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Bahais -- have watched the course of the Islamic revolution and its current plans for a "cultural revolution" with concern. But, although there is considerable prejudice in Iran against members of any ethnic or religious group that is a local minority, there continues to be little evidence that any group, with the exception of the Bahais and possibly the Anglicans -- is being systematically narassed. Members of minority communities who emigrate almost always express their concerns in general terms relating to the fervor of Ayatollah Khomeini's followers. Although minority community members are now being regarded with more suspicion by their Sniite neighbors, few emigrees can show evidence of specific acts of persecution. 25X1 Political and religious leaders have given public and private assurances that the rights of the Jews, Christians, and Toroastrians will be protected. The Bahais do not receive such guarantees. Shunned by most Muslims and a traditional target for conservative Shias, the Bahais have become even more vulnerable under the Khomeini regime. 25X1 Members of the non-Muslim minority communities realize that it will be some time before the central government can exert its authority throughout Iran and control the activities of the local groups that have taken it upon themselves to narass the religious minorities. They also are concerned that, with Ayatollan Khomeini's increased emphasis on the Islamization of Iran and the potential for even more anarchy after he dies, that no government in Tehran would intervene decisively to aid a minority group. 25X1 PA M 80-10345 25X1

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Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini knows no equality of religion, but freedom of belief and cultural autonomy are guaranteed. Although the President and high civil servants must be members of the official, Shia, religion, representation in the parliament is also guaranteed to the "official" minorities in the constitution:

The Iranian Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians are the only recognized minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and will act in personal matters and religious teachings in accordance with their religious regulations.

Principle 13

According to the Qoran, the Islamic Republican Government of Iran and the Muslims are bound to treat non-Muslims with good moral conduct and Islamic justice, and to observe their fundamental rights. This principle will be applicable to those who do not become involved in antificianic activities and in conspiracies against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Principle 14

Zoroastrians and Jews will each have one representative to the National Consultative Assembly, the Assyrian and Chaldean Christians will together have one representative, and the Armenian Christians of the north and south will each elect one representative...

Principle 64

The representatives of the minorities will take the bath (as a member of the Assembly) by mentioning the name of their holy book...

Principle 67

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Bahais

A campaign against the Bahais began in Iran before the fall of the Shah's regime as his last governments attempted to appear more acceptable to the clerics in the hope of forestalling the revolution. Since late 1978, Bahais have been dismissed from government and military positions; their homes, religious centers and schools have been attacked or appropriated; their bank accounts have been frozen. Some have been killed or executed, largely because of their beliefs; others have been forced to "convert" to Shiism.

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Incre is no reason to expect that the situation of the Bahais will improve significantly under the Khomeini regime. The Bahais — estimated by their leaders at "a few hundred thousand" last spring — are seen as Shia heretics whose religious beliefs are not derived from divine revelation as are Islam, Judaism, and

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Christianity. The Shah's relatively tolerant attitude toward them led to the popular view that the Banais were associated with the excesses of his regime, especially those of SAVAK. They are also accused of links with Israel by pro-Khomeini activists.	25X
Cnristians	
The most recent estimates indicate there are about one and a half million Christians in Iran: around 100,000 Assyrians and most of the remainder Armenians. With the exception of the Anglicans, as a group, they do not seem to have suffered severely from the excesses of the Islamic revolution. The future of Christian schools — which have been ordered to close — is not bright, however, and their permanent closure would have a strongly negative effect on the morale of the Christian communities. The schools have problems not so much because they are run by the Christian community, but because they are seen as centers of western influence and because some of them were well known for educating the children of members of the Shah's regime. Christian hospitals in Esfahan and Shiraz were appropriated by local committees a year ago.  Ine Iranian Christians may have escaped the attention of the pro-Khomeini zealots because they are mainly artisans, workers, and farm laborers who are well integrated into the society. They have a strong sense of community solidarity and are	25X
not objects of envy or jealousy. Leaders of the Christian communities have urged their people to assume a low-profile and not to become identified with criticism of the Khomeini regime.	25 <b>X</b>
In the past, both Armenians and Assyrians have been special targets of Soviet propaganda and the Tudeh Party has been well represented among them. If the Khumeini regime should turn against the pro-Soviet left, these communities may become targets.	25X
	25 <b>X</b> 1
Jews  fine obvious antipathy of the Khomeini regime toward lsrael and its support of Palestinian goals as well as the prospect of prolonged political and economic uncertainty have	
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led the Iranian Jewish community to doubt its place in a conservative Islamic Republic.	25 <b>X</b> 1
In the weeks before the Shah fell, an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 Jews left Iran and the emigration has continued. According to emigres and Jewish organizations, practically all of the poorer Jews have emigrated to Israel, leaving only the very wealthy or the small and medium scale businessmen and their families. Some primarily businessmen have returned after settling their families abroad. Estimates of the current size of the Jewish community vary from 35,000 to 75,000, with the majority living in Tehran and Shiraz.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Inere does not seem to be any official policy of discrimination or persecution of Jews in Iran, but isolated instances have kept the community on edge, especially in Tehran and Sniraz. Some Jewish bureaucrats have been purged from government positions and posts in private businesses, but the Jewish business community itself has suffered no more difficulty than have other elements of the commercial sector. Jewish businessmen passing through Western Europe have told local officials that the shortage of goods in Iran has presented unusually profitable opportunities to businessmen who have large inventories.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Israel and "Zionist conspiracies"; 120 to 130 remain under arrest without charge. An elderly woman was murdered in Shiraz in May 1979. Because of their associations with trade, industry, and financing, Iranian Jews often fall into a category of individuals regardless of religious affiliation whose activities receive an exceptionally critical investigation from the conservative Islamic authorities. Unfortunately, even when the investigation is centered on such activities, Jews are often also seemingly almost as a matter of routine accused of support for Isreal and Zionism.	25X1 25X1
Despite their concerns, there apparently is still a moticeable belief among Iranian Jews that Ayatollan Khomeini intends to follow through on the constitution's guarantees of religious freedom.	25X1 25X1

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Zoroastrians			
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even at temples located have not been afraid to at	tend services. They d	d their people	
their beliefs or whether	wever, that they suffere	d hearing of	
even at temples located have not been afraid to at several Zoroastrians have	in "disturbed" areas an tend services. They d e been dismissed from th wever, that they suffere	d their people id note that eir government	257

bureaucrats.

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